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THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
SEX CRIME TRIALS
Various state statutes and constitutions grant trial court judges discretion
to exclude spectators from criminal trials involving sex crimes. For example,
section 4 of New York Judiciary Law permits a court to exclude persons
without a direct interest in the trial when the proceeding involves divorce,
seduction, rape, sodomy, bastardy, or filiation.' The Mississippi Constitution
has a similar provision, under which a court, in its discretion, may bar in-
dividuals from the courtroom in prosecutions for rape, adultery, fornication,
sodomy, or crimes against nature. 2 In jurisdictions without specific statutory or
constitutional authorization, trial court judges often have used their inherent
judicial discretion to exclude spectators from sex crime trials.' Through
closure, courts and legislatures have attempted to protect sex crime victims
from the ordeal of a trial before curious and unrelated observers. 4 It is thought
that fewer spectators in the courtroom lessen the victim's trauma and allow
him or her to testify more fully and accurately, thus promoting the fair ad-
ministration of justice.'
N.Y. J01.). LAW 5 4 (McKinney 1968). See also N.C. GEN, STAT. 5 15-166 (during
testimony of prosecutrix in a trial for rape or attempted rape, court may exclude all except court
officers and those engaged in the trial itself); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 78-7.4 (court may exclude all
not directly interested in a trial of rape or other sex-related case).
2 Miss. CONST. art. III, 26. See also ALA. Cowl -. 1901, art. VI, 5 169 (conferring
discretionary authority upon a trial court to exclude from the courtroom all persons not necessary
to the trial in cases of rape and assault with intent to ravish).
See, e.g., State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58, 62 (1980). See generally Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 485, 496 n.8, 401 N.E.2d 360, 367 n.8 (1980). The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court engaged in an extensive discussion of the closure prob-
lem, but it eventually dismissed Globe Newspaper's appeal as moot. Globe Newspaper then ap-
pealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the
case, 101 S. Ct. 259 (1980), to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for reconsideration of
the issue in light of the intervening Supreme Court case Richmond Newspaper Inc. v. Virginia,
100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980). As of the date of the publication of this article, the Massachusetts
Supreme judicial Court had not redecided Globe Newspaper. See text and notes at notes 134-36 in-
fra. CI Lexington Herald Leader Co. v. Tackett, 601 S.W.2d 905, 906 (Ky. 1980) (The trial
court used its discretion to exclude all spectators from the courtroom during the testimony of
several young sodomy victims. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court acknowledged the trial court's
authority to close portions of sex crime trials to certain individuals, id., but held that the closure
order may not exclude all members of the press and public. Id. at 907.).
See text and notes at notes 13-22 infra. These closure orders affect the general public
and members of the press, but they do not affect necessary court personnel, the defendant, his
counsel, or his relatives and close friends. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-72 (1948) ("[A]ll
courts have held that an accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and
counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged."). But see Commonwealth v.
Wright, 255 Pa. Super. 512, 388 A.2d 1084 (1978), where the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
upheld the trial court's discretionary exclusion of all spectators, including the defendant's family,
during the testimony of a 59-year-old rape victim. The court determined that the inability of the
victim to testify, combined with the threat she received from the defendant's family, provided a
compelling basis for clearing the entire courtroom during the victim's testimony. Id. at 515, 388
A.2d at 1086.
' See text and notes at notes 13-22 infra.
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Until recently, the primary barrier to the closure of a sex crime trial was
the accused's sixth amendment right to a public trial. 6
 In a number of cases,
courts held that the state interest in closing a sex crime trial must be subor-
dinated to the accused's constitutional right to public scrutiny of the pro-
ceeding.' Actions by excluded spectators to compel access to these trials via the
Constitution did not similarly impede closure. Although some courts seemed to
recognize a common law protection of the public's asserted right of access to
criminal trials, 8
 few, if any, accepted the argument of an excluded member of
the public that the Constitution is an independent source of a public right of ac-
cess. 9
Nevertheless, in a recent decision, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. u. Virginia,'°
the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the strong public interests
in open trials" and held that the first amendment supports a public right of ac-
cess to criminal trials.' 2
 Richmond makes clear that the public now has a right,
comparable to that of the accused, to object on constitutional grounds to
closure of a criminal trial. Henceforth, when a member of the public moves to
compel access to a sex crime trial, courts must balance his first amendment
right recognized in Richmond against the state interest in closing the trial.
This note will examine the impact of a first amendment right of access on
the validity of orders closing sex crime trials. Initially, the conflicting interests
underlying such closure orders will be presented. Then, the article will outline
three possible bases of a public right of access to criminal trials including the
common law and the fir'st and the sixth amendments. This survey will
culminate with an examination of Richmond's delineation of a first amendment
right of access. Following the discussion of Richmond, this note will review the
manner in which courts, prior to Richmond, dealt with the problem of closure in
a sex crime case. During this review, this note will attempt to determine when
a court may close a sex crime trial after Richmond. It will be submitted that a
closure order withstands first amendment scrutiny if it excludes only a limited
6
 The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . ." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-58 (1968). All states also recognize the accused's
right to a public trial as a matter of state law. Note, The Right to a Public Trial in Criminal Cases, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1138, 1140 n.11 (1966).
' See, e.g., Cumbee v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1132, 1137, 254 S.E.2d 112, 115
(1979).
See, e.g., Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Ky. 1968); E.W. Scripps Co. v.
Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 151, 161-67, 125 N.E.2d 896, 899-903 (1955). But see United Press Ass' n
v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778-83 (1954). See generally text and notes at notes
39-56 infra.
9
 This author has been unable to find a decision in which a court has weighed a con-
stitutional public right of access to a sex crime trial against the state interest in protecting the vic-
tim of the crime. For a discussion of a first amendment public right of access, see text and notes at
notes 76-132 infra. For a discussion of a sixth amendment public right of access, see text and notes
at notes 60-75 infra.
'° 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
" Id. at 2821-30 (Burger, C. J., plurality opinion); 2833-39 (Brennan, J., concurring).
2 Id. at 2829, The decision allows that this first amendment right is not absolute. See
text and notes at notes 124-31 infra.
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number of spectators and operates only during the victim's testimony. The
order must allow some members of the press and the public to remain in the
courtroom throughout the trial in order to serve certain public trial concerns.
I. CONFLICTING INTERESTS
A. Interests Favoring Closure of a Sex Crime Trial
Initially, closure was justified in sex crime trials by the perceived need to
protect public morality. In 1897, the Supreme Court of Michigan reasoned
that it may be proper under certain circumstances to exclude portions of the
community from trials which might degrade public morals or shock public
decency.' 3
 Statutes enacted during this period reflect a similar concern.' 4
Protection of the public morality has since diminished in importance as a
justification for closure.' 5
 Many courts and legislatures now fouls on protec-
tion of the victim as the basis for the exclusion of spectators. 16 The decisions in-
dicate that protecting the victim advances two related interests. First, a
victim's trial ordeal may be mitigated by closing the trial to members of the
public. Testifying in an open, crowded courtroom may deleteriously affect the
health and emotions of the victim." A victim forced to recount details of a sex
People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 230, 71 N.W. 491, 492 (1897). The Yeager court
suggested that young people may be excluded from certain trials in order to protect public
morality, but held that a defendant's right to a public trial requires that all others be allowed to
attend. Id.
"1 See, e.g., ALA. CODE 5 12-21-202 (originally enacted in the Alabama Code 1907 5
4019); GA. CODE 5 81-1006 (originally enacted in the Georgia Acts 1890-1, p, 111), Both statutes
allow the exclusion of spectators in all cases where the evidence is vulgar, obsene, or relates to the
improper acts of the sexes and tends to "debauch the morals of the young." Id.
" In United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949), the defendant had been con-
victed in a closed courtroom for transporting a minor in interstate commerce for prostitution pur-
poses. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, explaining:
Moreover, whatever may have been the view of an earlier and more formally
modest age, we think that the franker and more realistic attitude of the present day
toward matters of sex precludes a determination that all members of the public,
the mature and experienced, as well as the immature and impressionable, may
reasonably be excluded from the trial of a sexual offense upon the ground of public
morals.
Id. at 923.
16 In Globe Newspaper, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 485, 401 N.E.2d 360 (1980), the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that the stated purpose of the Massachusetts
closure statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 278, 5 16A (West 1972), is "No spare girls of
juvenile age the embarrassment, humiliation and demoralization of testifying to all the sordid
details of rape, incest, carnal abuse or other crime involving sex, incidental to open trial with ex-
amination and cross-examination." 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 496-97, 401 N.E.2d at 368. The
court concluded that the statute is intended both to promote sound and orderly administration of
justice and to protect the victim's privacy. Id. at 499-500, 401 N.E.2d at 369. In United States ex
rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977), the court stated that the primary justifica-
tion for closing a trial during the testimony of a rape victim "lies in the protection of the personal
dignity of the complaining witness." Id. at 694.
17 See generally L. BRODYAGA, M. GATES, S. SINGER, M. TUCKER & R. WHITE, RAPE
AND ITS VICTIMS: A REPORT FOR CITIZENS, HEALTH FACILITIES, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AGENCIES, ch. 8 (1975); C. BOHMER, J UDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD RAPE VICTIMS (D. Chap-
pell, R. Geis & G. Geis eds. 1977).
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crime before a curious and unrelated audience can be expected to experience
shame and loss of dignity, however unjustified.la Indeed, a trial can create as
much psychological trauma for a rape victim as can the crime itself." As far as
minors are concerned, many psychiatrists agree that the traumatic psychologi-
cal effect of a sex crime on a child is at least as dependent on the youth's treat-
ment after discovery of the injury as it is on his treatment at the time of the of-
fense itself. 20 The interest in mitigating these harms through closure of a trial is
thus substantial.
The second interest served through protecting a victim of a sex crime is the
more effective administration of justice. Victims who anticipate humiliation or
embarrassment from a trial may decide not to prosecute. 2 ' As a result, assail-
ants often may go free. Closing a trial to protect a victim may mitigate this ef-
fect. If a victim does decide to prosecute, a crowded courtroom may deter that
witness from testifying in an uninhibited manner. 22 Testifying before many in-
dividuals who seek largely to be entertained would seem to be a far more in-
timidating experience than testifying before only those who have legitimate in-
terests in the trial. As a result, a victim may be less willing to relate certain
details of the experience when testifying before extraneous spectators. In-
complete testimony can be expected to hinder the state's prosecutorial efforts
and to taint the trial result. Closing a trial should also moderate this effect.
Thus, excluding spectators from a sex crime trial to protect a victim serves two
interests; it decreases a victim's emotional trauma and it also furthers the
judicial process.
B. Public Interests in Public Trials
Despite the arguments in favor of closing sex crime trials, members of the
public maintain significant interests in securing access to these trials. Indeed,
18 United States ex rel. Latimore, 561 F.2d at 694. See Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribula-
tion: Rape Cares in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. I, 88-89 (1977) 'hereinafter cited as Berger'.
I° L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, THE VICTIM OF RAPE 229 (1975), cited in Globe
Newspaper, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 498 n.12, 401 N.E.2d at 368 n.12.
2° Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 977, 980-81 (1969). Several state statutes permitting closure of sex crime trials
protect only victims below a certain age. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 278, S 16A (West
1972). Many courts, however, have refused to use age as a limiting factor in sex crime trial
closure decisions. For example, in Bivins v. State, 313 So. 2d 471 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), the
court examined a Florida statute allowing closure during the testimony of a sex crime victim
under 16 years old, and held that the statute's protection could extend to the non-minor victim in
Bivins. Id. at 472. The court stated that age should not be the determining factor in deciding
whether closure should be ordered. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Wright, 255 Pa. Super. 512,
514-15, 388 A.2d 1084, 1085-86 (1978) (The court excluded spectators to protect a 59-year-old
rape victim.); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58, 64 (1980) (The court excluded spectators to protect a
twenty-two-year-old rape victim and stated that "age and experience of the witness, though im-
portant factors in deciding whether to exclude the public, are not controlling.").
21 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 18, at 92.
22 See, e.g. , Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 1980 Mass, Adv. Sh. at 499, 401
N.E.2d at 369.
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the public has substantial interests in gaining access to all criminal trials." To
a large extent, the public's interests in open criminal trials are co-extensive
with those of the accused. Both the public and the accused are concerned with
fairness. The public has an interest in maintaining a fair and effective judicial
process; the accused seeks a fair trial. With respect to these aims, courts have
noted that public trials protect against abuses to which secret trials are prone by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, judges, and judicial processes to public
scrutiny and criticism. 24 Courts also have suggested that open trials discourage
perjury, since increased publicity heightens the opportunity for discovery of the
false testimony. 25 Finally, courts have submitted that the increased publicity
inhering in an open court may produce relevant evidence from persons who
otherwise would not be aware of the trial." With respect to the issue of fairness
at an individual trial, the accused's interest in a public trial appears to exceed
the public's interest, since trial abuses may deprive the defendant of his liberty.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the public interest in fair and open criminal
trials encompasses all criminal proceedings, it is broader than that of the ac-
cused. Thus, a requirement of open trials serves public interests beyond those
shared with a particular defendant.
In another important sense, the public's interest in open trials is broader
than that of the accused. Public trials serve wide political and educational func-
tions." More specifically, the freedom to observe criminal trials serves political
ends by reducing suspicions of prejudice and arbitrariness, which may develop
through closed proceedings and which may invite contempt for law." Thus,
open courtrooms tend to foster a sense of trust in the government. By attending
criminal trials, members of the public also may gain a better understanding of
the judicial process." This, it is hoped, increases confidence in and respect for
" See Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial Proceedings,
91 HARV, L. REV. 1899 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Trial Secrecy]; Note, The Right to Attend
Criminal Hearings, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1308 (1978) [hereinafter cited as The Right to Attend
Criminal Hearings]; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-72 (1948); Richmond Newspapers Inc. v.
Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
" See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
25 See, e.g., Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59-60 (9th Cir. 1944) (The accused
raised the defense of prostitution to his rape charge. The court stated that because of this defense
the trial should remain open. The presence of "another man who had had such paid inter-
course . . . might arouse in her a fear or sense of shame that would alter or weaken her testimony
against the accused.").
" See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n.24.
27 See generally Richmond, 100 S. Ct. at 2824-25 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion),
2837-39 (Brennan, J., concurring); 6 J. WiGmORE, EVIDENCE $ 1834, at 438 (Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1976).
28 See generally Richmond, 100 S. Ct. at 2837 (Brennan, J., concurring); Fenner & Koley,
The Rights of the Press and the Closed Court Criminal Proceeding, 57 NEB. L. REV. 442, 478-79 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Fenner & Koley].
" See Richmond, 100 S. Ct. at 2825 (Brennan, J., concurring); State v. Schmit, 273
Minn. 78, 87-88, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807 (1966) ("It is not unrealistic even in this day to believe
that public inclusion affords citizens a form of legal education and hopefully promotes confidence
in the fair administration of justice.").
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the criminal justice system. 3° It also has been noted that an open trial may pro-
vide an emotional outlet to a community shocked by a violent crime,'" and can
provide a cathartic sense that the guilty are ultimately punished."
Thus, the public has several significant interests in maintaining a system
of public trials. While recognizing these strong public interests in open trials,
courts often have closed criminal proceedings to members of the public for a
variety of purposes. Among other reasons, trial judges have closed courtrooms
to avoid prejudicial pre-trial publicity, 33 to conceal the identity of informants,"
to preserve trade 'secrets," and to enable witnesses to testify to sensitive matters
such as sex crimes. In response to closure orders, members of the public have
sought to safeguard their interests in open trials by asserting both common law
and constitutional rights of access." Until Richmond, the public had been un-
successful in securing protection of its interests via a generally recognized
public right of access.
II. ASSERTED PUBLIC RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS
A. A Common Law Right of Access to Criminal Trials
Open criminal proceedings are deeply rooted in the common law. As one
author has stated, "[o]ne of the most conspicuous features of English justice,
that all judicial trials are held in open court, to which the public have free ac-
cess, . . . appears to have been the rule in England from time immemorial.""
In 1948, the United States Supreme Court could not identify a single secret
criminal trial in England since the court of the Star Chamber in 1641. 38 The
Court also observed that no federal, state, or municipal court in the history of
this country had ever conducted a criminal trial in camera."
No solid evidence exists to pinpoint the original intended beneficiaries of
open trials." It may be, however, that the open trial right developed in favor of
the public, as opposed to the accused. By today's standards, the seventeenth
and eighteenth century English criminal defendant enjoyed few protections.
3° Id. See also United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 848 (3d Cir. 1978).
" Richmond, 100 S. Ct. at 2824-25; Globe Newspaper, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 495, 401
N.E.2d at 367.
" Id.
" Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 370-71 (1979).
34 United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1274 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975) (closure to conceal the identities of undercover agents).
" State ex rel. Ampco Metal, Inc. v. O'Neill, 273 Wis. 530, 532, 78 N.W.2d 921, 922
(1956).
36 See text and notes at notes 39-132 infra.
" E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73-74 (6th ed. 1967), cited in Richmond, 100 S.
Ct. at 2822.
" In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266. The Court of the Star Chamber apparently disregard-
ed many common law rules of criminal procedure and often tortured the accused to obtain a con-
fession. There is some dispute, however, as to whether the Star Chamber trials were public. Id.
at 269 n.22.
' 9 Id. at 266.
4° See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 418-23 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Radin, The Right to
a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381-84 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Radin].
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The accused was kept in confinement, not given notice of evidence against
him, and denied counsel." This lack of interest for the defendant's rights in-
dicates that the criminal justice system was not concerned with giving the
defendant a right to an open trial. Yet, throughout this period, courts required
open trials." These facts suggest that open trials developed to protect the
public's interests. " In any event, the open trial interests of both the public and
the accused eventually received explicit protection in various early charters of
the American colonies. For example, the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of
1776 read that "in all prosecutions for criminal offenses, a man bath a right to
. . . a speedy pUblic trial."'" The 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West
New Jersey similarly protected the public's rights by explicitly allowing that
"any person . . . may freely come into, . . . all or any such tryals, . . that
justice may not be done in a corner nor in any covert manner. "45
While the early charters gave protection to the open trial interests of both
the public and the accused, the public did not fare so well under the United
States Constitution. The drafters of the Constitution safeguarded the accused's
public trial right in the sixth amendment. / 5 They included no analogous provi-
sion, however, explicitly securing a public right of access to criminal trials.
This lack of explicit constitutional protection left the status of the public's com-
mon law open trial rights unclear. After the passage of the sixth amendment,
courts had to determine whether the public's common law right of access was
left unaffected by the Constitution, or whether the accused's sixth amendment
protection abrogated a need for a public right of access to criminal trials. The
decisions reflect a split of authority on this issue.
Many courts addressing the issue prior to Richmond continued to recognize
a public right of attendance at criminal trials." For example, in fohnson v. Simp-
son," the Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld a reporter's challenge of an order
excluding him from a trial of an adult who allegedly had contributed to the
delinquency of a minor. 49 The court noted that members of the public are par-
ties to all criminal proceedings." In determining that excluded individuals hold
" Radin, supra note 40, at 383-84. In addition, the accused was not given the right to
confront witnesses, and the originals of documents were not required to be produced. Id.
42 Id.
45 See,. e.g., The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, supra note 23, at 1322. Conversely,
these facts could indicate that open trials arose to guard the accused's interest in order to provide
at least a minimum of fairness.
44
 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 1776, ¶ IX, cited in Gannett, 443 U.S. at 425
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
45
 The 1677 concessions and agreements of West New Jersey was the charter or collec-
tion of fundamental laws. Reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 188 (R. Perry ed. 1959), cited
in Richmond, 100 S. Ct. at 2823.
46 See note 6 supra.
" See text and note at note 8 supra.
" 433 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1968).
49
 Id. at 647.
" Id. at 646. The court stated that to rely entirely on a defendant to determine whether
a proceeding was public or secret "would take from the public its right to be informed of a pro-
ceeding to which it is an interested party." Id.
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an enforceable right to attend criminal trials, 5 ' the Johnson court explained that
a public right of access is "so well settled that it requires little amplification." 52
A few courts, however, denied any common law protection to members of
the public excluded from the courtroom." In United Press Association v. Valente, 54
the Court of Appeals of New York held that reporters excluded from a trial
have no right or privilege of which they may complain." The court reasoned
that the public interest is protected adequately by the power of the accused to
assert his constitutional public trial right and the discretionary ability of the
judge to deny closure. 56
 Thus, in some cases courts have viewed the public ac-
cess issue entirely in terms of the accused's right to a fair and open trial. These
courts have not displayed an equal respect for the significant public interests in
open proceedings and the common law history of a public right of access to
criminal trials.
B. Asserted Constitutional Rights of Access
Due in part to the uncertain status of a common law right, members of the
public have sought to identify a constitutional right of access to criminal trials.
Assertions that the sixth amendment protects such a right initially met with
slight success at the lower court level," but were rebuffed in a recent Supreme
Court decision. 58
 There was some lower court precedent prior to Richmond sup-
porting a first amendment right of access." Richmond marks the first time, how-
ever, that the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional foundation for a
public right of access. This section of the article will consider both the sixth and
first amendment as bases of a public right of access.
1. Sixth Amendment Right of Access
One court has held that the public may demand access to a trial through
the sixth amendment. In United States v. Cianfrani, 6° the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit determined that the sixth amendment protects a public right of
access to pre-trial proceedings." In reaching this conclusion, the court noted
the accrual of benefits to both the public and the accused through open trials"
and reasoned that members of the public, like the accused, should be able to
5 ' Id. at 646-47.
52 Id. at 646.
" Geise v. United States, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1959) (per curiam), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 842 (1959); United Press Association v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778-83
(1954). Cf. United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868
(1949) (the court stated that the defendant may waive his right to a public trial and compel the ex-
clusion of spectators).
54 308 N.Y. 71,123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
55 Id. at 81, 123 N.E.2d at 783.
56 Id.
" See text and notes at notes 60-64 infra.
53 See text and notes at notes 65-75 infra.
59 See text and notes at notes 89-94 infra.
6° 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978).
61
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protect their public trial interests constitutionally via the sixth amendment."
This unprecedented holding in Cianfrani has been criticized as "straining even
flexible constitutional language beyond its proper bounds."" Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court recently rejected the sixth amendment as a
source of a public right of access. In Gannett Co. v. Depasquale, 65
 the Court deter-
mined that the sixth amendment protection accrues in favor of the accused
only" and, consequently, that it offers the public no independent right to at-
tend criminal trials. 67
Because Gannett involved access to a pre-trial hearing, a narrow reading of
the decision would limit its holding to a pre-trial situations. By using the term
"trial" several times in discussing his sixth amendment ruling," however,
Justice Stewart's majority opinion suggests a broader reading than the limited
fact situation might warrant. Justice Stewart first acknowledged a right at com-
mon law for the public to attend trials." He then rejected the contention that
the sixth amendment embodies this common law right. 70 Justice Stewart add-
ed, however, that even if the sixth amendment does embrace the common law
rule, the present case involved a pre-trial closure order!' He contended that no
common law tradition exists with respect to pre-trial hearings." The opinion
concluded, however, by stating broadly that the public enjoys no sixth•and
fourteenth amendment rights to attend criminal trials." This conclusion makes
the pre-trial/trial distinction unnecessary. Justice Stewart's majority opinion
thus does not clarify whether the closure order was upheld due to the distinc-
tion between pre-trial and trial closure orders, or whether the Supreme Court
believes that the public enjoys no sixth amendment right to attend criminal
trials. 74
 Although the Court's rejection of a sixth amendment public access
" Id. at 852-54.
" See The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, supra note 23, at 1321.
" 443 U.S. 368 (1979). In Gannett, the Court upheld a trial court order excluding the
public and the press from a pre-trial suppression hearing. Id. at 394. The defendants argued that
the adverse publicity surrounding the confessions that were the subject of the hearing would
jeopardize their ability to receive a fair trial. Id. at 375. The trial court granted the defendant's
motion after finding of a reasonable probability of prejudice. Id. at 376. The state did not oppose
the motion, id. at 375, but Gannett Newspapers challenged its exclusion on first, sixth, and four-
teenth amendment grounds. Id. at 376,
66 Id. at 379-80.
67 Id. at 391. Justice Stewart's majority opinion reserved the question of whether the
combination of the first and fourteenth amendments offers the public a right of access. Id. at 392.
Justice Stewart explained that if such a right exists it was given "all appropriate deference by the
state also prius court in the present case." Id.
68 In Richmond, Justice Blackmun noted that Justice Stewart used the term "trial" no
less than twelve times in the Gannett decision. 100 S. Ct. at 2841 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
6q
 443 U.S. at 384.
7° Id. at 384-87. The Court stated that "[i]n conspicuous contrast with some of the ear-
ly state constitutions that provided for a public right to open civil and criminal trials, the Sixth
Amendment confers the right to a public trial only upon a defendant and only in a criminal
case." Id. at 386-87.
7 ' Id. at 387.
" Id. at 387-91,
" Id. at 391.
" Many commentators noted this ambiguity in the months following the Gannett deci-
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right to criminal trials was contained in dicta, Gannett heavily burdens any
future attempt to recognize this right. 75
2. First Amendment Right of Access
Although Gannett represented a set-back to the public's efforts to gain
recognition of a constitutionally protected right of access to criminal trials, it by
no means closed the door. The first amendment remained an attractive poten-
tial source of such a right. The Supreme Court had indicated in past decisions
that it might be receptive to recognizing a first amendment right of access to
criminal trials. For example, in Landmark Communications Inc. v. Virginia, 76 the
Court determined that at least in the absense of a clear and present danger,"
the first amendment forbids criminal punishment of persons who report
truthful information concerning pending cases or grand jury investigations."
The Court resolved that protection of the reporting of judicial proceedings lies
near the core of first amendment protections." In a similar decision, Craig v.
Homy," the Court refused to uphold a contempt order for the publishing of an
editorial concerning a pending case." Explaining that a trial is a public event
and that what occurs in a courtroom is public property, 82 the Craig majority
determined that the contempt order violated the publisher's right to freedom of
the press guaranteed by the first amendment."
Both Landmark Communications and Craig demonstrate the Court's will-
ingness to protect the reporting of trial information. Neither decision, however,
resolves any issues of access rights to that information. Rather, the decisions
deal only with restraints on publication of already gathered news. For the
Supreme Court to recognize a first amendment right of access to criminal
trials, it would have to take these two decisions a step further. The Court would
have to extend the first amendment right to report trial information to a first
sion. See, e.g., Stephenson, Fair Trial-Free Press: Rights in Continuing Conflict, 46 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 39, 63 (1979); The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L, REV. 60, 65 (1979).
's In his concurring opinion in Gannett, Justice Powell placed a public right of access
within the first amendment. 443 U.S. at 397, In finding this first amendment right, Powell
recognized "the importance of the public's having accurate information concerning the opera-
tion of its criminal justice system." Id. He specifically stated that this right accrues in favor of the
press. Id. He wrote that he "would hold explicitly that petitioner's reporter had an interest pro-
tected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments: . . . [T]his constitutional protection derives, not
from any special status of members of the press. . . . [The press' 'acts as an agent of the public at
large,' each individual member of which cannot obtain for himself 'the information needed for
the intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities.' " Id. at 396-97 (quoting Saxbe v.
Washington Post'Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974)).
76 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
" Id. at 845-46. To constitute a clear and present danger, the court required that the
danger to the judicial system must not be remote but, rather, it must immediately imperil. Id. at
845. The court determined that the interest in protecting the confidentiality of a state judicial
review commission fell short of this requirement. Id.
" Id. at 837-42.
79 Id. at 838.
88 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
Si Id. at 375-78.
82 Id. at 374.
83 Id. at 368-70, 375-78.
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amendment right to be present at the trial to view or gather that information."
Rights of access to information, however, have rarely received first amendment
protection." Prior to Richmond, one of the Supreme Court's most extensive
recognitions of such a right occurred in Branzburg o. Hayes. 86 In Branzburg, the
Court noted that general news gathering qualifies for first amendment protec-
tion," for "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the
press could be eviscerated. "88
At least one lower court used Branzburg to find a first amendment right of
access to criminal trials. In State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips," the
Supreme Court of Ohio overruled the trial court's order excluding the press
from a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence." The Ohio Supreme Court
reasoned that Branzburg suggests the existence of a first amendment right to
gather trial information. 9 ' The Phillips court concluded that exclusion from the
courtroom directly impaired or curtailed plaintiff Dayton Newspaper's ability
to gather news concerning the trial, 92
 and thereby abridged its first amendment
right to freedom of the press." It cannot be discerned from the court's discus-
sion whether a member of the non-press public can maintain a first amend-
" As Justice Brennan noted in Richmond, "[t]he First Amendment has not been viewed
by the Court in all settings as providing an equally catagorical assurance of the correlative
freedom of access to information. . . ." Richmond, 100 S. Ct. at 2832.
Prior to Richmond, the Supreme Court had noted the importance of public access to a
courtroom, but had never recognized a first amendment protection of that interest. See In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266-70, In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), the Supreme Court
reviewed a habeas corpus petition, in which the petitioner alleged he had been deprived of his
constitutional right to a fair trial, on account of the massive prejudicial publicity generated by the
press who had been allowed to cover the proceedings by the trial judge. The Court granted the
petition, concluding that the trial court ought to have more strictly controlled the press' coverage
of the proceedings. Id. at 358-63. In the course of its opinion, though not recognizing a first
amendment right of access to criminal trials, the Court noted: "A responsible press has always
been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal
field. . . The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive
public scrutiny and criticism." Id. at 350. See generally Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965);
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
85 For general discussions of a public right of access to information, see Note, The Rights
of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974); Comment, The Right
of the Press to Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 166 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as The Right of the Press to Gather Information].
See also First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) ("[T]he First
Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit
government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may
draw.").
" 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In Branzburg, The Court rejected a claim that reporters possess
a constitutional right to refuse to reveal confidential sources to a grand jury.
82 Id. at 707.
88 Id. at 681.
" 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976).
9° Id. at 469, 351 N.E.2d at 135.
91 Id. at 459-60, 467-68, 351 N.E,2d at 130, 134.
92 Id. at 459, 351 N.E.2d at 129.
93 Id. at 469, 351 N.E.2d at 135.
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ment action to gain access to a criminal trial." Regardless, the combined effect
of Branzburg, Landmark Communications, and Craig laid the foundation for the
Supreme Court to recognize either a press or a general public right of access to
criminal trials based on the first amendment.
Indeed, in 1980 the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia" explicitly identified a first amendment right of access for the public
and the press to attend criminal trials. 96 In Richmond, the Virginia trial court
had approved defense counsel's motion for a closed proceeding during the
defendant's fourth trial on a murder charge. 91 The defense hoped that a closed
trial could avoid technical problems that might lead to a mistrial, necessitating
yet another new trial." Reporters for Richmond Newspapers objected to their
exclusion. Both the trial court and the Virginia Supreme Court, however, re-
jected their motions. 99 Upon a petition for certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court reviewed and reversed the closure order.'°° The Supreme
Court decision consists of seven opinions. Seven of the eight Justices par-
ticipating found that the first amendment granted the public a right of access to
criminal trials.'°' Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, rejected any constitu-
tional protection of the public's right.'"
Although a majority of the Court agreed that the public enjoys a first
amendment right of access to criminal trials, the different opinions do not agree
on its foundation within the first amendment. Specifically, the concurring
opinions of Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens all identify this open trial
right as a relatively unprecedented first amendment right of access to impor-
tant information.'" In contrast, Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion and
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion view Richmond as a fairly traditional first
amendment decision.'" They perceive the right to attend criminal trials, at
least in part, as protected by the first amendment freedom to assemble in a
public place.'" Each interpretation should be carefully analyzed and
distinguished.
94 The court's explanation of the right 431 access is limited to a discussion of the first
amendment freedom of the press. The opinion does not mention a correlative first amendment
public right of access to, or assembly in, a courtroom.
95 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
96 Id. at 2828-29.
97 Id, at 2816. The defendant's conviction in the first trial was reversed on appeal. Id.
Two subsequent retrials ended in mistrials. Id.
99 Id. Defense counsel stated that he did not "want any information being shuffled back
and forth when we have a recess as to . . . who testified to what." Id.
99 Id.
Id. at 2830.
' 131 Id. at 2829 (Burger, C. J., plurality opinion); id. at 2830 (White, J. 'concurring); id.
at 2830-31 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 2832-39 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 2839-41
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 2841-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Justice Powell took no part
in the opinion.
102 Id. at 2842-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 2830 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 2832 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at
2842 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
194 Id. at 2828 (Burger, C. J., plurality opinion); id. at 2840 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id.
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Through Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens' opinions, Richmond
significantly expands earlier recognitions of first amendment rights to gather
information. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens labeled Richmond "a
watershed .case,"'" since never before had the Court determined that an ar-
bitrary denial of access to information infringes on the first amendment. 107
Similarly, Justice Blackmun interpreted this decision as a recognition of first
amendment rights of access to informationi 08 Justice Brennan expanded upon
this point by distinguishing traditional first amendment rights from freedom of
access to information. 109 He noted that in the past the Court had protected the
freedom of expression much more stringently than the correlative freedom of
access to information. "° In order to develop this distinction further, he placed
freedom of access to information in a separate first amendment analytical con-
text." When first amendment protections move from bans on prior restraints
of expression to protections of rights of access to information, Justice Brennan
viewed the amendment as playing a "structural" role in preserving a
republican system of self-government."' He stressed that the structural protec-
tions of the first amendment not only guard expression, but they also insure
that valuable debate over public questions is informed."s Justice Brennan
hoped that freedom of access to criminal trials and the resulting dissemination
of trial information would inform the public and serve to alleviate many fair
trial concerns." 4
It is difficult to determine from these three concurring opinions whether
the right of access indentified accrues to each individual member of the public
or whether the right accrues only to the public generally. For example, when
Justice Stevens explained the open trial right as a public right to acquire
newsworthy matter, he never maintained that this right allows each individual
member of the public to enter any courtroom to gather information.'" Similar-
ly, neither Justice Brennan nor Justice Blackmun explicitly stated that this first
amendment public right of access accrues to members of the public individual-
ly." 6 If this open trial right does not accrue to members of the public in-
dividually, the right may be protected adequately by allowing only certain
members of the public to attend trials to gather and disseminate the trial infor-
mation. The essential purpose of this right of access would still be served where
only a limited number of spectators are present, since the public, through it's
"agents," will be informed of all trial events. Interpreting the right of access as
'" Id. at 2830 (Stevens, J., concurring).
1 ° 7 Id. at 2831.
'" Id. at 2842.
1 ° 5 Id. at 2832 (Brennan, J., concurring).
"° Id. Justice Brennan cited several decisions to support this point including: Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849 (1974); Zemel v. Rush, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). 100
S. Ct. at 2832.
1 " 100 S. Ct. at 2833.
"2 Id.
1 " Id.
114 Id. at 2834-39.
11 ' Id. at 2830-31 (Stevens, J., concurring).
16 Id. at 2832-39 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 2841-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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accruing only to the public generally would allow greater flexibility to trial
court judges, who, for various reasons, may wish to exclude only some spec-
tators from the courtroom."'
In contrast, both Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion and Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion specifically indicate that the first amendment
right to attend criminal trials accrues to each member of the public individual-
ly." 9 In the plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger determined that the first
amendment must be read as protecting the right of individuals to attend
criminal trials, so as to give significance to the express first amendment
guarantee of freedom of assembly. 19 Significantly, he seemed unwilling to
characterize this first amendment right to attend criminal trials as part of a
distinct line of first amendment access rights.'" Instead, he viewed the first
amendment right of assembly as having long protected access rights to areas
traditionally open to the public. 12 ' By equating courtrooms with streets, side-
walks, parks, and other places customarily open to the public, he placed the
right of access to a courtoom on par with the right of peaceable assembly in
other public places.' 22 Justice Stewart took this point a step further when he
noted that due to the important role the public plays in criminal proceedings,
the right of assembly is more significant in a courtroom than in such places as
streets and parks.'"
Consequently, two distinct characterizations of the first amendment right
of access to criminal trials emerge from Richmond. The position of Justices
Brennan, Stevens and Blackmun is that Richmond develops new first amend-
ment rights to gather information which may accrue to individual members of
the public or, alternatively, may accrue only to the public generally. The view
of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart perceives Richmond as a somewhat
conventional first amendment decision allowing individual members of the
public to assemble to view criminal trials.
In addition to this divergence, the various opinions in Richmond do not
agree on the extent of this open trial right. While the entire Richmond Court
recognized that the right is not absolute, the decision does not offer a unified
approach to balance the interests that may override this first amendment
right.' 24 Chief Justice Burger would require an overriding interest articulated
in findings to justify closure of a trial.' 25 In a footnote, he explained further that
'" See text and notes at notes 155-59 infra,
"a 100 S. Ct. at 2828, 2830 n.18 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion); id. at 2840 (Stewart,
J., concurring).
"9 Id. at 2828 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
"° Id. at 2827-28.
12 ' Id. at 2828.
122 1d.
' 2 ' Id. at 2840 (Stewart, J., concurring).
124
 The trial court in Richmond made no findings to support, and offered no justification
for, its closure order. Moreover, it made no inquiry whether alternative solutions would have
provided the defendant with a fair trial. 100 S. Ct. at 2829-30. Thus the Supreme Court, on
review, was not presented with any interest to balance against the Richmond first amendment
right and had no opportunity to refine a standard by which to conduct such balancing.
125 Id. at 2830.
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this standard would allow reasonable limitations upon the unrestricted occupa-
tion of a courtroom by members of the press and public when courtroom order
or capacity demanded it. 126 In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart revealed
that he also would allow trial court judges to impose reasonable limitations
upon the unrestricted occupation of a courtroom by members of the press and
public.' 27 He mentioned the preservation of trade secrets and the sensibilities of
a youthful prosecution witness in a rape trial as interests that he perceived to
satisfy his standard for closure.'" Justice Brennan stated that he would balance
the structural interest in gathering information against closure by considering
"the information sought and the opposing interests invaded."'" He refused to
speculate, however, as to what countervailing interests might be sufficiently
compelling to reverse the presumption of openness."° In his concurring opin-
ion, Justice Blackmun noted the variety of approaches presented by the Court
and lamented that "uncertainty marks the nature — and strictness — of the
standard of closure the Court adopts."'
Thus, several Justices offer language intended to serve as a balancing
standard when trial courts rule on closure motions. Nevertheless, because the
decision does not present a unified alalytical framework within which to solve
the balancing problem,'" trial judges can be expected to have great difficulty
in translating the various proposed standards into concrete tests with which to
rule on closure motions. As a result, a court's first reaction might be to look to
the balancing approaches developed in sex crime cases prior to Richmond. If so,
the court then must decide whether the tests developed to reconcile the com-
peting interests recognized in the pre-Richmond cases will continue to apply, in
light of Richmond's articulation of public trial interests and of a first amendment
right intended to safeguard those interests. The next section of this note
surveys the resolution of the sex crime trial closure issue in cases decided before
Richmond. It will be shown that several compromises were developed. Each
compromise will be examined to determine if it can now be utilized in a man-
ner consistent with Richmond.
III. ALTERNATIVE COMPROMISES TO THE CLOSURE PROBLEM IN
SEX CRIME TRIALS
A. Three Solutions Offered in Pre-Richmond Decisions
Prior to Richmond, most courts allowed the dangers to the sex crime victim
and to the judicial process to limit both the accused's sixth amendment right to
"6 Id. at 2830 n.18. While allowing reasonable limitations on access, Chief Justice
Burger maintained that a trial judge may impose these limitations only "so as not to deny or un-
warrantedly abridge . . • opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of
public questions immemorially associated with resort to public places." Id.
127 Id. at 2840 (Stevens, J., concurring).
18 Id. at 2840-41 n.5.
129 Id. at 2834 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1 " Id. at 2839.
"I Id. at 2842 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
12
 See text and notes at notes 124-31 supra.
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a public trial and the public's common law right of access to that trial.'"
Courts disagreed, however, on the extent of the allowable deprivation of these
public trial rights. As a result, courts generally offered one of three widely
ranging compromise solutions. These solutions should be analyzed to ascertain
which, if any, satisfy the first amendment requirements as articulated in the
Richmond decision.
At one end of the spectrum is a solution that intrudes heavily on public
trial concerns by allowing the exclusion of all spectators during the entire trial.
A few months prior to Richmond, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in-
dicated that under certain circumstances it would upheld such a closure order.
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,' 34 the court stated that Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 278 section 16A requires the exclusion of both the press
and the general public from trials of certain sex crimes while the minor victims
of those crimes are testifying.'" The court interpreted the statute to allow the
closure order to extend the length of the trial if the exclusion of spectators is
necessary to preserve evidence required for a just trial.' 36 Thus, the court in
Globe Newspaper Co. sanctioned orders that exclude all members of the press and
public during the entire trial.
In post-Richmond decisions, a closure order excluding from a courtroom all
members of the press and public during an entire sex crime trial, is over-
broad"' and appears to contravene Richmond in at lease one important respect.
By operating for the length of the trial, the order extends in time beyond what
is required to protect a sex crime victim. Spectators to a sex crime trial present
the greatest danger to the emotional health of the victim and to the accuracy of
his or her testimony during the period of such testimony.'" The added value of
a closure order prolonged beyond a victim's testimony is merely speculative.
Thus, it would be difficult to assert a sufficiently compelling interest in favor of
closing a trial during that portion of the trial in which the victim is not testify-
13 See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 485, 401 N.E.
2d 360 (1980); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (1980); Commonwealth v. Wright, 255 Pa. Super.
512, 515, 388 A.2d 1084, 1086 (1978); United States ex rel. Smallwood v. LaValle, 377 F. Supp.
1148, 1150-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
' 3' Globe Newspaper, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 489-505, 401 N.E.2d at 364-72.
195 Id. at 501-03, 401 N.E.2d at 370-71. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, 16A (West
1972) provides in pertinent part:
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other
crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the person
upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed, . . . the
presiding justice shall exclude the general public from the courtroom, admitting
only such persons as may have a direct interest in the case.
Id.
1S6
 Globe Newspaper, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 504, 401 N.E.2d at 372.
137 "[A] governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). For a
discussion of the overbreadth doctrine, see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
136 See text and notes at notes 140-56 infra.
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ing. 139 Absent such an interest, it seems clear that a closure order extending the
length of a sex crime trial does not override the public's right of access, and
thus cannot stand after Richmond.
Most courts prior to Richmond required a more compromising solution to
the sex crime closure problem than did the Globe court. Typically, courts al-
lowed closure orders only if the order was limited to the victim's testi-
mony. 140
 These courts reasoned that the victim experiences the most humili-
ation and embarrassment during his or her testimony, and noted that the
dangers to the victim and to the judicial process are less acute during other
parts of the trial."' For example, in State v. Santos,"2 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court allowed that a trial court may exclude all spectators from at
least a portion of a sex crime trial. 143 The court noted, however, that the
limited purpose of such a closure order is to enable a victim to testify as ac-
139 Closure of an entire trial may be necessary if a court wishes to conceal a victim's
identity and the trial proceedings to protect a victim's privacy. The Supreme Court has not com-
pletely foreclosed this possibility. In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), a rape vic-
tim's father brought a damages action against a television station for broadcasting his daughter's
name. Id. at 474. The broadcast violated a Georgia statute that made it a misdemeanor to broad-
cast a rape victim's name. Id. at 471. The Supreme Court ruled that the first amendment forbids
the punishment of the publication of a rape victim's name that was obtained from court records
open to public inspection. Id. at 496. The Court allowed, however, that "[i]f there are privacy in-
terests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the States must respond by means which avoid
public documentation or other exposure of private information." Id.
It may be that a rape victim at a trial has such a significant privacy interest. Several
Supreme Court cases have recognized a constitutionally protected right of privacy. See, e.g., Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Many of these cases involve privacy interests
relating to sexual matters. In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts statute
that made it a crime to distribute contraceptives with the intent that they be used for the purpose
of preventing contraception, unless distributed by doctors or druggists to married persons.
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55. The Eisenstadt Court protected the individual's privacy right to
procreational choice. Id. It would not be an illogical extension to recognize that the rape victim's
privacy interest involves the need to protect the victim during a trial that concerned an event
allegedly denying her such a choice.
Yet even if a court recognizes a victim's constitutional right to privacy, an order
secreting entire proceedings would meet considerable barriers. The combination of Richmond's
first amendment right of access to criminal trials and a defendant's sixth amendment right to a
public trial would make it unlikely that such an order could withstand a balancing of constitu-
tional rights.
140 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 599 P.2d 199 (1979), in which the court noted
that spectators were excluded only during the victim's testimony, and observed: The period of
exclusion, therefore cannot be said to have exceeded the scope that was necessary to achieve the
legitimate purpose of preserving the victim's dignity." Id. at 250, 599 P.2d at 206. See also State
v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (1980); Douglas v. State, 328 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976).
341 See, e.g., State v. Santos, 413 A.2d at 63, in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court
stated that "the need to close the courtroom will often be acute when, because the witness is
young, emotionally upset, or the victim of a sex crime, he cannot bring himself to testify in open
court." Id.; Commonwealth v. Stevens, 237 Pa. Super. 457, 467-68, 352 A.2d 509, 514 (1975).
142 413 A.2d 58 (1980).
143 Id. at 63.
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curately and under as little emotional stress as possible.'" The court deter-
mined that this purpose may be achieved by limiting the duration of the closure
order to the period of the victim's testimony."' The Rhode Island Supreme
Court explained that an order so limited, even if it excluded all spectators,
would strike "an acceptable balance between the accused's right to a public
trial and the need to protect the witness. . . ,,I46
In post-Richmond decisions, it is necessary to determine whether the Rhode
Island Supreme Court's solution, whereby all spectators are excluded from the
courtroom, but only during the victim's testimony, 147 can withstand first
amendment scrutiny. For first amendment purposes, this type of order is over-
broad in terms of whom it affects. By excluding all members of the press and
the general public, the order unduly infringes on both the first amendment
right of assembly recognized by Chief Justice Burger 148
 and the first amend-
ment right to gather information noted by Justice Brennan. 148
 Under such an
order no one is allowed to assemble in the courtroom and no one is allowed to
gather trial information directly for one of the most important portions of the
trial. The public could scrutinize this portion of the trial only secondarily
through court records or interviews with court personnel or family members.
This loss of immediate communication between the trial and the public limits
the usefulness of the trial information. Transcripts are not "news, but
history," 150
 and they do not reflect unspoken actions that can aid in inter-
preting the proceedings.'" Thus, such secondary sources do not help expose
trial abuses to an observer as effectively as his presence at the trial. By substan-
tially lessening the public's opportunity to scrutinize and learn from the trial
proceedings, this loss of immediate communication infringes upon first amend-
ment interests.'" Such an order should not issue if a reasonable, less intrusive
solution is available.'"
1 " Id. at 63-64.
" 5
 Id. at 63.
"6 Id.
14 ' See text and notes at notes 140-46 supra.
"a See text and notes at notes 118-22 supra.
19 See text and notes at notes 109-14 supra.
' 5° Fenner & Koley, supra note 28, at 454.
151 See State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 471, 351
N.E.2d 127, 136 (1976) (Stern, J., concurring) ("[A] transcript of a proceeding is a sterile
substitute for observing the actual conduct of a hearing, as reviewing courts are well aware. Ac-
tual observation of the demeanor, voice, gestures of the participants in a hearing must be as in-
formative to the press and public as those same matters are to juries during trial."); Richmond
Newspapers, 100 S. Ct. at 2839 n.22 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("the availability of a trial
transcript is not substitute for a public presence at the trial itself').
152 " Indeed it is the hypothesis of the First Amendment that injury is inflicted upon our
society when we stifle the immediacy of speech." A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61
(1975).
US See note 137 supra. See also Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 100 S. Ct. 826, 836 (1980) (Legitimate state interests may be served, but only by narrowly
drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessary interference with first
amendment freedoms).
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Alternatives less intrusive on public trial rights are available. In fact, most
courts prior to Richmond required a compromise more protective of public trial
interests. To better protect open trial concerns, courts allowed members of the
press to remain in the courtroom throughout the trial and excluded only non-
press members of the public and only during the victim's testimony.'" In so
doing, courts effectively limited the operation of the order to the minimum time
necessary to accomplish the order's purpose — allowing the victim to testify
openly and with less fear of emotional harm. In addition, since the press can
preserve many public trial interests by keeping open throughout the proceeding
the instantaneous channels of communication between the courtroom and the
public,'" it is arguable that these orders still maintained the contact necessary
to ensure a "public" trial. Indeed, some courts would state simply that a pro-
ceeding attended by the press or a "non-secret" trial,'" constitutes a public
trial, thus satisfying sixth amendment and common law requirements.' 57
Other courts rejected this reasoning, yet reached the same result, excluding the
general public but not the press from the victim's testimony. These courts con-
ceded that the exclusion of non-press spectators infringed upon the defendant's
right to a public trial, but concluded that this right is not absolute and may be
overriden by the state interest in protecting the victim of a sex crime.'"
Although courts used different analyses, the generally accepted com-
promise closure order prior to Richmond excluded only the non-press public and
only during the testimony of the victim. This solution worked a balance be-
tween the public's common law and the accused's sixth amendment open trial
interests on the one hand, and the interests in protecting the victim of a sex
crime on the other. Eliminating these spectators from this portion of the trial
was intended to mitigate the victim's ordeal. At the same time, the on going
presence of members of the press maintained the essential qualities of an open
trial. There was no indication in the pre-Richmond cases of whether such a com-
promise could withstand first amendment scrutiny.
It should now be examined whether the compromise generally accepted in
the pre-Richmond cases — allowing the press to remain in the courtroom while
spectators are excluded during the testimony of the victim — remains a
reasonable alternative after Richmond. This solution should be analyzed for its
1 " See, e.g., Douglas v. State, 328 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976); State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243,
599 P.2d 199 (1979).
'" In Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1968), the Kentucky Court of Appeals
stated that:
there is nothing that better protects the rights of the public than their [the press']
presence in [trial] proceedings. . . . The news media should be accorded some
priority in this respect for they have the facilities to disseminate the information of
what transpires to a much broader audience than those who can gather in a crowd-
ed courtroom.
Id. at 646.
ise Bivins v. State, 313 So. 2d 471, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
17 See, e.g., id.; Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 459, 172 P. 273, 247 (1918).
"8
 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 249-250, 599 P.2d 199, 205-06 (1979);
United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691, 694 (7th Cir, 1977).
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protection both of the victim and of public trial concerns. Although the exclu-
sion of the general public should aid the victim significantly by decreasing the
inhibiting effect of a large and curious crowd, it is arguable that because of the
continued presence of the press this solution does not provide adequate protec-
tion to a sex crime victim. It appears that the presence of the press would main-
tain a high level of anxiety in a victim who is aware of the press' ability to
disseminate potentially embarrassing trial information. 159 The presence of the
press during the victim's testimony also affords the victim less privacy than if
members of the press were also excluded from the trial. Upon closer analysis,
however, the apparent benefits of excluding the press lose their significance.
Excluded members- of the press still will have access to court records and court
personnel and will be able to publish trial news from these sources. In addition,
the increase in privacy that would result from the absence of the press is of
speculative value. The victim in any case will be forced to testify before court
personnel, the defendant, his counsel, his relatives, and his close friends. The
only possible benefit the added exclusion of the press can offer a victim is a false
sense of security through the unfounded belief that his or her testimony will be
kept secret.
This compromise, whereby non-press spectators are kept out of the court-
room during the testimony of the victim, might also be attacked from the other
side as not sufficiently safeguarding first amendment access rights. As courts
reasoned in decisions prior to Richmond, however, the presence of the press
maintains the essential characteristics of a public trial.'" Indeed, several opin-
ions in Richmond mention that even without a closure order, members of the
press often act as "agents" of the public in providing trial news."' For exam-
ple, Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion admits that people acquire in-
formation concerning trials primarily from the print and electronic media. ' 62
Thus, this type of order minimizes the disruption of the ordinary flow of trial
information to the public.
One interpretation of Richmond supports this type of compromise closure
order. Under the view that the first amendment right to gather trial informa-
tion inheres in the public generally, as opposed to each member of the public
individually,' 63 the public's right is safeguarded. Although this kind of order
hinders individual access, it essentially provides for a general public right to
gather trial information during the victim's testimony . through the presence of
its most qualified representative, the press.'" Not dissimilar to the pre-
159 See Globe Newspaper, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 503, 401 N.E.2d at 371. In determining
that the press should be excluded from the sex crime trial, the court stated that "the [victim's]
knowledge that those few extra persons were reporters who might publish her testimony to
thousands would probably increase by orders of magnitude her sense of exposure, vulnerability,
and alarm." Id.
16° See text and notes at notes 156-58 supra.
16 ' Richmond, 100 S. Ct. at 2825 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion); id. at 2832-33 n.2
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 2840 n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring).
162 Id. at 2825.
162
	
text and notes at notes 115-17 supra.
16{
	 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the Supreme Court noted
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Richmond decisions holding that a "non-secret" trial is enough to satisfy sixth
amendment and common law public trial rights, 165 this analysis suggests that,
notwithstanding the protests of excluded individuals, this type of order does not
violate the general public's first amendment right of access.
A closure order which is limited to the victim's testimony and which
operates to exclude the general public, but not the public's representative, the
press, thus has surface appeal and seems in accord with one possible interpreta-
tion of Richmond. This solution, however, presents three interrelated problems.
First, the interpretation of Richmond that sanctions it is drawn from the concur-
ring opinions of Justices Brennan, Stevens, and Blackmun.' 66 These opinions
might just as easily be read to recognize a first amendment right of access in-
hering in individual members of the public.' 67 Under this view, a closure order
excluding non-press spectators would violate individual first amendment
rights.
Second, according to Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion and Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion in Richmond, members of the public possess per-
sona! rights of assembly in criminal courtrooms.'" Although both opinions
permit time, place, and manner restrictionsi" and allow that individuals' ac-
cess may be restricted based on the seating capacity of a courtroom,"° their
language makes clear that exclusions of individuals to protect sex crime victims
would be an infringement of individual rights of assembly."'
As a third related barrier to this type of closure order, there is a recent line
of Supreme Court cases reinforcing the interpretation of Richmond's first
amendment right of access as inhering in each individual member of the
public. 12 In these cases, the Supreme Court has stated that the first amend-
ment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to in-
formation not available to the public generally.'" For example, in Nixon v.
Warner Communications, Inc. 174 television networks and other members of the
the important role of the press in disseminating trial information when it stated that:
in a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which
to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily
upon the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations....
Without the information provided by the press most of us and many of our
representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the
administration of government generally.
Id. at 491-92.
165 See text and notes at notes 115-17 supra.
166 See text and notes at notes 106-16 supra.
167 See text and notes at notes 115-17 supra.
166
	 text and notes at notes 118-22 supra.
169 Richmond, 100 S. Ct. at 2830 n.18, 2840.
1 " Id.
171 Id. at 2828, 2840.
172 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Nixon v. Warner Communica-
tions, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
I " Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16; Nixon, 435 U.S. at 609-10; Pell, 417 U.S. at 833-34; Saxbe,
417 U.S. at 850.
174 435 U.S. 589.(1978).
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media sought to make copies of certain tape recordings introduced as evidence
at a trial but not yet physically accessible to either the press or the public."s
The Court noted that it may use its discretion to override the public's common
law right of access to judicial records and documents" 6 and concluded that
these tapes need not be made available to the press for copying.'" The Court
stated that the first amendment grants the press no right to trial information
superior to that of the general public, and that within the confines of a court-
house, the press' first amendment rights are no greater than those of any other
member of the public.'" Thus, Nixon represents an obstacle to the sex crime
closure compromise whereby only the press is granted first hand access to the
victim's testimony.
Each of these three barriers to a compromise closure order that would
allow the press, but not the general public, to observe the victim's testimony,
reflects the Supreme Court's reluctance to establish a preferred first amend-
ment position for the press. The Court commendably has sought to avoid plac-
ing individuals in a position where they are confined to receive only that infor-
mation deemed important by members of the press. When an individual is not
forced to rely on others to provide trial information, she is likely to feel more
secure knowing that the criminal justice system can be scrutinized personal-
ly."9 In this important respect, individual rights of access to a courtroom, far
more than a general public right of access, should promote a sense that court-
rooms are freely accessible public institutions.
Thus, none of the pre-Richmond compromises fits well under the preferable
interpretation of Richmond's first amendment right, by which each member of
the public — press and individual alike — may assert a right of access. Accord-
ingly, a solution that meets the foregoing objections and that will both protect
the victim adequately and withstand first amendment scrutiny is needed.
B. A Proposed Solution
A court seeking to balance the interests in protecting a sex crime victim
against first amendment public trial concerns should engage in a well defined
process to determine whether a closure order is required.
First, to determine whether closure is appropriate, a court should conduct
a pre-closure hearing. Such a hearing would satisfy due process concerns by
providing an opportunity to be heard and a prompt final judicial determina-
16 Id. at 591-94.
"6 Id. at 597-99.
1 " Id. at 610. In rejecting the argument that the sixth amendment public trial guarantee
required the release of the tapes for copying, the Court stated that "the requirement of a public
trial is satisfied by the opportunity of members of the public and the press to attend the trial and
to report what they have observed." Id.
"6 Id. at 609-10.
179 To this end, Justice Brennan stated in Richmond, 100 S. Ct. at 2832, that public ac-
cess to criminal trials seeks to maintain "public confidence in the administration of justice," id.
at 2837, and to insure that its members "share the conviction that they are governed equitably."
Id.
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tion.'" At the hearing, the court should ascertain whether the interest in pro-
tecting the sex crime victim overrides individual first amendment rights. Con-
cern for the sex crime victim becomes overriding when it apears that, without
closure, the victim will experience serious psychological harm and trouble in
testifying accurately.' 8 ' A court should consider such factors as the relative
maturity of the victim, the emotional state of the victim, and the likelihood that
the victim will be called upon to testify to matters that will cause significant
trauma, embarrassment, and difficulty in testifying.
If a court finds closure appropriate, the court should exclude all but a
small group of randomly selected members of the press and the public during
the testimony of the victim. Such an order would protect the victim by decreas-
ing the intimidating size of the courtroom crowd during the difficult period of
his or her testimony. This type of order also satisfies the concerns of Richmond
regarding a public trial' 82
 and the concerns of both Richmond and Nixon regard-
ing the equal treatment of the press and the public.' 83
This order meets Richmond's public trial demands by operating in a man-
ner least restrictive of first amendment rights. As previously discussed, in
tailoring an order that infringes on first amendment rights to its least op-
pressive form, a court should limit its effect to the victim's testimony and
should avoid closing a trial to all members of the press and the public. More ex-
tensive orders overly intrude on the interests Richmond attempts to protect. The
type of closure order proposed here, however, allowing a small number of press
and non-press spectators to remain in . the courtroom effectively limits the intru-
sion on first amendment rights by maintaining the essential characteristics of a
public trial. 184
A closure order excluding all but a small group of members of the press
and public during the victim's testimony also complies with the concern, ex-
pressed in both Richmond and Nixon, for the ordinary individual's right of access
to information. While the inclusion of additional members of the press and
fewer non-press spectators would, perhaps, better facilitate the dissemination
of trial information, placing non-press individuals in a less preferred position
' 8° See Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-62 (1975). In Southeastern
Promotions, the Court stated that the settled rule is that a prior restraint "avoids constitutional in-
firmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a cen-
sorship system." Id. at 559. The Court then determined that "only a procedure requiring a
judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint." Id. at 560. See Procunier v. Mar-
tinez, 416 U.S. 369, 417-19 (1974) (The Court determined that prisoners, whose letters are cen-
sored, must be given a reasonable opportunity to protest censorship decisions. Id.)
Accordingly, at the hearing to decide whether to close a sex crime trial during a victim's
testimony, members of the press and the general public who are attending the trial or who pre-
sent themselves at the hearing with an interest in attending the trial, should be given an oppor-
tunity to assert their first amendment rights of access to the courtroom.
' 8 ' Cf. Richmond, 100 S. Ct. at 2840-41 n.5 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("the sensibilities
of a youthful prosecution witness, for example, might justify ... exclusion [of the public] in a
criminal trial for rape, . . . ."). See, e.g., Trial Secrecy, supra note 23, at 1918-19.
182 See text and notes at notes 95-133 supra.
"3
 See text and notes at notes 166-79 supra.
"4 See text and notes at notes 154-58 supra.
384	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 IVor22:361
violates a substantial purpose of this first amendment protection. Such an
order would tend to create a sense of detachment and lack of concern for the
average spectator. In contrast, a closure order that accommodates both
members of the press and individual members of the public conveys a respect
for a citizen's desire and need to study the judicial system personally.
Thus, if a court finds closure necessary to protect a sex crime victim, the
compromise whereby all but a small group of both press and non-press spec-
tators are excluded from the courtroom during the testimony of a victim offers
a viable alternative to the closure problem. This solution guards a victim by
eliminating any crowd-like atmosphere from the courtroom. It also maintains
consistency with the public access concerns of Richmond and Nixon.
CONCLUSION
The interests in protecting a sex crime victim from the trauma of testifying
in a crowded courtroom are substantial. Closing a courtroom decreases the in-
hibiting size of the crowd, which protects the victim from embarrassment and
trauma. Closure also furthers the judicial process by lowering a barrier to the
prosecution of a sex crime and by helping to enable those victims who do prose-
cute to testify accurately to the details of the crime. The interests in maintain-
ing trial publicity, however, are also considerable. The public's first amend-
ment right of access requires not only that courts maintain the flow of trial in-
formation to the public, but that they create a sense of courtroom availability
and openness to individual members of the public. Closing the courtroom to all
but a small number of members of the press and general public during the
testimony of sex crime victims serves the interests of both the victim and the
public. The victim is protected through a decrease in the size of the courtroom
crowd. Open trial interests are protected by the inclusion of enough members
of the press and public to keep the channels of communication open between
the public and the trial. In addition, this solution maintains some degree of ac-
cessibility to both the press and the general public.
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